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The  pharmaceutical  market  in  Cyprus  has  been  characterised  by high  volume  and  a steep
increase  in  per-capita  expenditure  over  the  past  decade.  Most  importantly,  the  market  is
fragmented  due  to the  absence  of universal  health  insurance,  and  the  uninsured  have  to rely
exclusively  on the  private  market.  The  objective  of this  study  is  to  examine  the  weaknesses
of  the Cypriot  pharmaceutical  market  before  the  ﬁnancial  crisis;  to discuss  the measureseywords:
harmaceutical policy
eform
yprus
recently  introduced  after  recommendations  by the  Troika;  and  to  propose  interventions
that  can  improve  access  to  pharmaceuticals  and  efﬁciency  without  compromising  health
outcomes.  Apart  from  the  introduction  of new  pharmaceutical  policies,  we  also  recommend
the swift  implementation  of  universal  health  insurance.
© 2015  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  Ireland  Ltd. This  is  an  open  access  article  under
Y-NC-Nthe  CC  B
. Introduction
In 2013 Cyprus became the fourth Euro zone country
after Greece, Ireland and Portugal) to resort to IMF, EC and
CB (the so-called Troika) funding as a result of the ﬁnancial
risis. As in other countries that were bailed-out, the Troika
ecommended the implementation of measures in (among
thers) the pharmaceutical market in order to cut costs.
What makes the pharmaceutical market in Cyprus
nique in the EU context is that, in contrast to other mem-
er states, there is no universal health insurance scheme.
hile employees in the public sector, people with an
nnual income below a certain threshold and patients
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suffering from certain chronic diseases are covered by pub-
lic health insurance (accounting for 85% of the population
[1]), anyone who  does not fall within these groups has
to rely on the private sector for insurance and treatment.
Cyprus is also the only EU country where out-of-pocket
expenditure is higher than public health expenditure
(Fig. 1) [2]. As demonstrated in Fig. 1, there has been a
steep increase in total pharmaceutical expenditure, from
128 million Euros in 2006 to 217 million Euros in 2011 [3].
While studies normally focus on public sector health
insurance in EU countries, it is important to include the
private health sector in Cyprus in the discussion, because
part of the population relies exclusively on this as they do
not qualify for public health insurance. In addition, patients
who are covered by public health insurance often have to
resort to the private market and pay for treatment out-of-
pocket, as a result of unsatisfactory waiting times [4].
Regardless of the macroeconomic environment, govern-
ments should always seek to increase efﬁciency and reduce
waste in health markets, in order to increase access to care
 access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.
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) in milFig. 1. Pharmaceutical Sales in Cyprus, by sector (private or public
without sacriﬁcing outcomes. This means that either the
same level of treatment can be achieved at a lower cost
(thus releasing funds that can be used elsewhere in health-
care), or additional services can be provided at the same
cost. Whether in crisis or not, reforms towards better and
more efﬁcient healthcare should be a constant policy goal.
Especially in a country like Cyprus without universal health
insurance, reducing waste can help fund the expansion of
health insurance to the entire population. In this context,
a country in crisis can implement measures that increase
efﬁciency, rather than simply resorting to blunt cuts, as the
latter can be a threat to public health [5–7].
Given the interest in reforms in bailout countries, we
follow the example of a recent publication by Vandoros
and Stargardt [8] who studied the reforms in the Greek
pharmaceutical market during the ﬁnancial crisis. The
objective of this paper is to present the Cypriot pharma-
ceutical market and its weaknesses prior to the crisis; to
discuss the measures that were implemented in Cyprus
as a result of the ﬁnancial crisis; and to propose meas-
ures to help achieve the goal of higher efﬁciency without
sacriﬁcing quality of and access to healthcare. In contrast
to the changes imposed by the Troika (which focused on
cost-containment), we recommend reforms in the Cypriot
market that will reduce waste, increase access to care
and allocate resources in a way that would increase social
welfare, which should be implemented regardless of the
macroeconomic situation.
2. The Cypriot pharmaceutical market before the
crisis
The structure of the Cypriot pharmaceutical market dif-
fers signiﬁcantly compared to other EU countries, and is in
a sense unique with regards to insurance coverage, pricing
and procurement of medicines. This originates not only
from the fact that public health insurance is not univer-
sal, but also that both in-patient and out-patient drugs inlion Euros. Source: Ministry of Health of Cyprus, unpublished data
the public segment of the market are supplied exclusively
via tenders.
Patients covered by public health insurance can receive
pharmaceuticals for free from any public pharmacy, when
presenting a prescription from a public sector physician.
Prior to the crisis there were no volume-control measures
in place, resulting in overprescribing and overconsumption
of drugs, as in the case of antibiotics [9]. 39% of all prescrip-
tions included more than ﬁve products [10], while patients
could also receive OTC drugs and vitamins for free from
the public sector. Apart from an unnecessary burden on
the health budget, drug overconsumption has been asso-
ciated with adverse drug reactions and increased risk of
hospitalisation [11]. The complete absence of demand-side
measures exacerbated this phenomenon: Intergraded pre-
scribing guidelines for physicians were limited, and there
were no physician budgets nor any prescribing monitoring;
in addition there were no incentives for rational prescrib-
ing, or user charges as in other EU countries [12].
While tenders are popular for the procurement of
medicines in most hospital markets in the EU, these are
only used for a limited number of products in few out-
patient markets, such as the Netherlands and Germany.
In Cyprus, however, the procurement of all drugs in out-
patient and hospital markets for the public system is done
via tenders, whereas the bidder offering the lowest price
wins the right to supply the entire market for two years (a
form of a reverse auction) [13]. In general, when there is no
monopoly power at the molecule or therapeutic level, ten-
dering leads to lower prices than reference pricing or price
caps, and shifts in market shares [14,15], meaning that for
such markets in the public sector, the Cypriot authorities
have taken advantage of all possibilities for price reduc-
tions. However, this is not always the case, as some drugs
are on patent, which may lead the government to purchase
drugs at the therapeutic class level, whereas one drug per
class is purchased. If the product is the only drug in a ther-
apeutic class, meaning that there are no close substitutes,
the provider has additional market power, and the tender
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ill not lead to any signiﬁcant price cuts, due to monopoly
ower. In any case, public expenditure on pharmaceuticals
n Cyprus appears to be mainly volume rather than price-
riven [9,16].
Prices for in-patent drugs in the private sector are deter-
ined based on an international reference pricing system,
imilar to what holds in all other EU markets, with the
xception of Denmark, Germany, Sweden and the UK.
he price is determined as the average of available prices
n Austria, Sweden, France and Greece, plus 3% to cover
mporting costs, on top of which a 37% pharmacist mark-up
pplies. As price revisions occur at longer intervals, com-
ared to other EU countries [17], private sector prices in
yprus remain relatively high.
For off-patent markets in the private sector, generic
rugs are 20% cheaper than the originator price. This
irectly translates to relatively high prices, given that in
ther EU countries reference prices push generic prices
own [18,19], while price caps limit prices directly to a
ower fraction of the originator price than 80% (e.g. 50%
n France; 52% in Austria [20]).
. Policy changes recommended by the Troika
The Troika recommended the development of clinical
uidelines as an important tool for rational prescrib-
ng [21,22]. As a result, guidelines for upper respiratory
nfection, gastroenterology, osteoporosis, osteoarthritis,
ypertension, diabetes, depression, and hypercholes-
erolemia have been delivered and ten more are currently
eing developed. The implementation of guidelines is in
ccordance with Troika’s recommendation to render GPs
s gatekeepers (thus restricting direct access of patients to
pecialists), as is the case in the English NHS [23].
There was little room for further price reductions in the
ublic sector as a result of tendering, at least for products
ith substitutes. Consequently, the Troika focused on the
mplementation of other policies that can enhance the efﬁ-
iency of the system through the implementation of cost
ffectiveness analysis for the 10 most costly products and
ome conditions with expensive treatments (although this
ssue had already been partly explored by the MoH  due to
n ofﬁcial report of General Audit of Cyprus [24]). While
ost effectiveness analysis is a prerequisite in assessment
f pharmaceuticals for inclusion in the formulary in many
U countries [25], HTA (whose value is well documented
26,27]) was only recently introduced in Cyprus. In this con-
ext, in mid  2013 a technical committee was formed with
he objective to set up terms of reference for conducting
TA in Cyprus. Currently, four rapid HTA reviews are being
eveloped.
As a way to address volume, the Troika requested the
ntroduction of user charges as a demand side control mea-
ure in the public sector. A 0.50-Euro co-payment fee per
rescription was implemented to tackle moral hazard and
verprescribing. User charges are not a preferred option
uring economic downturns because they provide barri-
rs to healthcare. However, the 0.5-Euro prescription fee is
ow, and in any case much lower than other EU countries.
iven the low cost, this co-payment works more as a way
o address moral hazard, rather than a way to actuallylicy 119 (2015) 563–568 565
ﬁnance the health budget. It is worth noting that a number
of patient categories are already exempt from co-payments
[28], and this exemption should be expanded further to vul-
nerable socio-economic groups, as also suggested by Cylus
et al. [29].
The Troika recommended new income criteria for public
health care beneﬁciaries, reducing health insurance cov-
erage even further. This negative development pushed
150,000 people into the private market, where they will
have to pay for their healthcare entirely out of pocket [30].
With regards to the private sector, the Ministry of Health
introduced price reductions in order to reduce the ﬁnancial
burden (although this was  not explicitly demanded by the
Troika). We  found only a modest 5.8% weighted reduction
in total expenditure when we  compared 2 baskets of 1691
commonly prescribed products under the old and new pri-
cing system [31]. This is minor reduction compared to other
countries such as Spain and Greece [32]. Moreover, prices
below 10 Euros were frozen. This is of major importance
since 47% of total private wholesale pharmaceutical expen-
diture falls in this category. In addition, OTC products will
be priced freely.
In this context, pharmacists’ remuneration in the pri-
vate sector changed from a ﬂat percentage to a regressive
margin, which may  remove the incentive to dispense more
expensive medicines (37% for EPR below 50 Euros, 33% for
EPR between 50 and 250 and 25% for EPR over 250 Euros).
A prescription fee of 1 Euro was also implemented, can-
celling out part of the beneﬁt of the new pricing scheme.
This has a negative impact on private sector patients, with-
out being combined with any new activities of pharmacists
such as cognitive services and management of chronic con-
ditions, which are usually the reason for introduction of
prescription fees in other countries [33].
Physicians’ response to measures was positive [34,35]
and they were involved in the process by participating in
the creation of guidelines. Indicatively, some guidelines
have already been ﬁnalised [36]. The introduction of the
regressive pharmacy proﬁt margin has a limited effect
on the proﬁtability of private pharmacists, since the low-
est proﬁt margin tier (25%) pertains to medicines which
are mainly dispensed by public sector pharmacies. Conse-
quently, private sector pharmacists also reacted positively,
and the 1-Euro prescription fee may  have contributed to a
positive reception of the measures.
4. Options for further policy changes towards
efﬁciency
4.1. Public sector
The special nature of the Cypriot pharmaceutical mar-
ket leaves little room for many of the available supply-side
drug policies that are implemented in other EU countries.
While other countries in crisis have implemented tenders
to achieve swift savings in the pharmaceutical market,
Cyprus had already exhausted this possibility prior to the
crisis, so interventions must be sought elsewhere. How-
ever, new drugs can achieve higher prices due to the lack
of direct substitutes with comparable clinical outcomes,
which makes the tendering process ineffective. In this case
ealth Po566 P. Petrou, S. Vandoros / H
there may  be room for alternative pricing policies, which
the Cypriot government may  draw from experience in
other countries. Innovative pricing mechanisms that can
be adopted include risk-sharing and managed entry agree-
ments, in which case coverage depends on clinical evidence
and the available budget. These have been applied “where
risk and uncertainty about value are very high in relation to
the cost of the treatment, and the result is a very high cost
per unit of health gain, which is deemed unaffordable by
health insurers” [37]. Via this mechanism, manufacturers
may  have to lower their prices, provide discounts or adjust
the cost-effectiveness ratio [38,39]. In Italy, current out-
come-related risk sharing schemes generated savings up to
50% for innovative products (such as erlotib and sorafenib)
[40], while in the UK a non-outcome coverage decision
was reached between a pharmaceutical company and NHS,
which provides that NHS will cover the cost of ﬁrst 14 injec-
tions, and any subsequent costs burden the supplier [41]. In
the same context, a value based pricing scheme, according
to which the price should be aligned to the clinical value
of the product, could be selectively implemented, as some
authors propose [42].
To address overprescribing (which can also be a threat
to public health [11]), health authorities can introduce
interventions on the demand side. These can include
ﬁnancial incentives for physicians to encourage ratio-
nal prescribing, such as budgets, as in the English NHS
[12,43]. Although budgets can reduce overprescribing [44],
if they are not carefully designed and adjusted for each
physicians’ patients’ demographic and other character-
istics, they may  provide a barrier to access to care. In
addition, information campaigns can inform patients of
the dangers of overconsumption of drugs, as overpre-
scribing may  be driven by demanding patients [45]. Of
course, the preparation of clinical guidelines for all major
diseases must go forward as planned and, once ready, care-
fully followed by physicians, as these can also prevent a
switch in prescribing from off-patent towards in-patent
medicines [46]. It is also essential that e-prescribing is
implemented across the country, so that prescribing is
monitored and appropriate feedback is sent to physi-
cians (currently this is only done on a trial basis in two
hospitals). Finally, appropriate detailing and marketing
regulation must be adopted: Pharmaceutical Marketing
activities have not been regulated apart from an ethics
code agreed among seven R&D Companies and there is
some evidence that aggressive promotion of some products
may  accelerate their early uptake and induce supply-side
demand [47–49].
Further implementation of HTA seems challenging
due to economies of scales issues and duration of the
process but a combination proposed by Vandoros and
Stargardt [8], which limits external price referencing to
countries that already apply HTA and then adjusts for
the local market needs and characteristics could be a
rational starting point. An alternative could be the intro-
duction of two versions of HTA with regards to Budget
Impact Analysis of products: (a) A full version for esti-
mated sales above a certain threshold; and (b) a rapid
(light) version for estimated sales below this threshold
[50].licy 119 (2015) 563–568
4.2. Private sector
While the public sector appears to demonstrate rela-
tively low prices in most cases, things are different in the
private sector. Given that these patients have no other
option, this part of the market also deserves attention, until
universal health insurance is implemented. First, setting
generic prices at the 80% level of originators is relatively
high and the potential for further savings for private-
sector patients is foregone. Different generic policies can
be adopted, such as lower price caps or internal reference
pricing. Both these mechanisms also work as a price ﬂoor
apart from a price ceiling, but they normally lead to lower
prices than 80% of the originator price, which is the case
in Cyprus [19]. Free generic pricing has resulted in even
lower generic prices in the UK and US [19,51], but this
is not recommended for a small market with few generic
competitors, as Cyprus. For in-patent markets, external ref-
erence pricing can work well, as long as prices are updated
frequently and adjusted for local market characteristics;
otherwise prices just reﬂect the situation in other markets
in a different time period.
OTC drugs provide treatment for minor and frequent
conditions and as such they constitute an important seg-
ment of pharmaceutical care. It appears that the fact that
the market in Cyprus is small, and the presence of other
market characteristics cannot enhance competition, as
prices have recently been increasing, indicating that there
is perhaps room for action on this particular segment of the
market [52].
In addition, the recent introduction of a pharmacist fee
seems to have been unnecessary, since it was  not substanti-
ated by the introduction of additional pharmacist activities
[20].
5. Discussion and policy implications
We  have discussed the policy measures that have been
adopted in the Cypriot pharmaceutical market as a result
of the ﬁnancial crisis and have recommended measures
for further changes in order to increase efﬁciency with-
out sacriﬁcing access to care. Our recommendations for
the public sector include risk-sharing for innovative drugs;
restrictions on marketing and detailing; e-prescribing at
the national level; and demand-side measures such as
clinical guidelines, physician budgets, and prescription
monitoring. For the private sector we  recommend inter-
nal reference pricing or lower price caps for generic drugs,
and more frequent revisions of prices under the external
reference pricing scheme for in-patent originators. Table 1
presents a summary of the measures suggested by the
Troika and their main expected effects.
The private sector has been ignored in the effort to
rationalise the pharmaceutical market. Nevertheless, the
importance of this segment is underlined by the fact that
a signiﬁcant part of the population is not covered by
public health insurance, which is aggravated by the exclu-
sion of 150,000 beneﬁciaries from public sector health
care coverage, imposed by the Troika. While interventions
are needed in the private sector to ensure the afford-
ability of drugs, the ultimate goal should be to swiftly
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Table  1
The Troika’s main recommendations on pharmaceuticals.
Issue Health sector Current state Troika’s approach Drawbacks/barriers Author’s comments
Pricing Private External reference
pricing
Not explicitly raised yet
(although price reductions
were implemented due to
the crisis)
Low prices may  lead to
shortages of medicines due
to reduced proﬁtability of
industry, which is
aggravated by the fact that
it is a small and
unattractive market
Signiﬁcant reductions
can be achieved under
a uniﬁed market in the
context of a National
Health System.
Frequent price
revisions and lower
generic prices
Public Tendering (based
on reference
pricing)
Reduced agreed budget for
public health expenditure
is not exceeded
Limited room for further
price reductions
Introduction of
supplementary
approaches to further
enhance system such
as risk sharing and
managed entry
agreements
Cost  sharing Public Not applicable Introduction of capped
ﬁxed co-payment fee to
reduce medically
unnecessary demand for
pharmaceuticals
May restrict access to
health care
Cost sharing can help
address the problem of
overusing medicines,
which has been
dominant in the public
sector. Socioeconomic
conditions must be
taken into account so
that it does not work as
a barrier to treatment
HTA  Public Selectively Introduction of intergraded
HTA to selected
pharmaceuticals and
consumables
Economies of scale (human
resources). A
time-consuming process
that requires resources and
capacity
Referencing countries
that have HTA.
Alternatively, two
versions (rapid and
full) based on Budget
Impact Analysis (BIA)
Clinical guidelines
and medical audit
Public Prescribing
guidelines for high
value products
Implementation of
guidelines and medical
audit for ten high volume
and value diseases
Education, monitoring and
audit are essential. It must
be decided how divergence
from guidelines will be
Essential measure that
must be prioritised
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14:119.hift towards a system of universal health insurance, as in
ther EU countries. The exclusion of patients from pub-
ic health insurance is in the exact opposite direction,
nd can only have a negative effect on the population’s
ealth.
While the authorities work towards increasing efﬁ-
iency with the implementation of (mainly) demand
easures, it is crucial that any savings that occur are re-
nvested in the health sector as there is great need for
dditional funding elsewhere in the healthcare system
53]. Previous studies have shown that in other countries
ffected by the crisis, the populations’ health deteriorated,
ither directly [54–57] or indirectly [58]. In order to pre-
ent a public health disaster, any interventions adopted
ust increase efﬁciency without sacriﬁcing quality of or
ccess to healthcare.
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